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1983 
GUNTHER MAIER 
MIGRATION DECISION 
WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
I I R - DISCUSSION 16 1983 
1.0_l!'!TROQ!,KTION 
It is a well known fact in regional literature that the 
willingness (or ability) of people to migrate from one place 
to an other declines with distance between these places. 
This effect has been observed for a long time span and for 
economically, culturally and socially very different coun-
tries so that 1t is sometimes claimed to be "one of the few 
' constants ' observed in Dehavioral research" ( Lewy .-\ 
Wadycki, 1974,p.199) 
This observation has been given different interpretations 
partly depending on the discipline the researcher comes 
from. "Economists have suggested that the effect of dis-
tance is a cost of moving, and sociologists have suggested 
that it reflects reluctance to leave familiar surroundings 
or is a surro~ate for intervening opportunities." {Lewy 
wadycki, 1974, p.199) 
A more recent interpretation is that the distance effect is 
mainly caused by unc er til 1 nty and lack of information. 
(9eals, Levy, Moses, 1967, Greenwood, 1969• 1971, 1975} The 
writers argue that people cannot compare the opportunities 
1,1 different reyions as long as they don't know them, and 
the probab i l 1 ty that people know the opportunities in a 
specific region declines with the distance to that region. 
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This hypothesis is quite appealing, but although there is a 
huge body of literature on decisions under risk and uncer-
ta1nty and on imperfect information in economics, in 
migration research only a few attempts have been made, to 
give this uncertainty hypothesis a more formal basis. (See 
for example Siebert, 1970, Smith et.al., 1979, MacKinnon and 
Rogerson, 1980, Rogerson and MacKinnon, 
1982, Gordon and Vickerman, 1982) 
Rogerson, 
Most studies simply refer to this effect and interpret tne 
distance variable as a proxy for it and all the other 
effects mentioned above without explicitly saying which 
mechanism the researcher has (or has not) in mind. 
It is the aim of this paper to do a step in the direction of 
clearifying the theoretical connection between the 
uncertdinty hypothesis and distance • 
The paper uses job search models developed in economic lit-
erature. but it will turn out that the information assump-
tions drawn in the - so called - flstandard search model" 
(Lippman & ~cCall, 1979) are too strong to g1ve the distance 
effect a meaningful 
tion assumptions are 
interpretation • Therefore 
relaxed and a search 
the informa-
model with 
imperfect information 
applied. (Rothschild, 
on the 
1974) 
wage offer distribution is 
So the connection between the 
uncertainty hypothesis and distance is not as clear as 
introduction 2 
some former st:uc!1es irnpl icitly assume. 
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2.0 PRELIMINARY NOTES ON SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPT~ 
There are a few concepts 
the paper. The first one 
tion. I need to assume 
which are used almost throughout 
is a special type of regional iza-
that all regions are disjoint 
functional regions. That is commuting and other inter-
actions of everyday life are assumed to occur only within 
re~ions. In the migration decision a decision about 
regions - individuals therefore have to take into account 
not only the region's characteristics as a place of 1 iving, 
but also as a place of working, of recreation and so on. 
However, it 1s not assumed that these characteristics are 
of the same level all over the region. There 
ation oetween places within one region and the 
ual is assumed to utilize this variety in 
is vari-
individ-
an optimal 
manner. He works in a factory or in a downtown bureau, 
lives on the fringe of the regional center, spends his 
weekends out 1n the country, or behaves in some other way 
that maximizes his utility. The main point is that all 
these everyday interactions are assumed to occur within 
the region and that the only type of interaction between 
regions on an ind1v1dual level is migration. 
The other two assumptions used throughout the paper are well 
known in the context of decision makinq in an uncertain 
preliminary notes on some methodological concepts 4 
environment. The first one is the "expected utility rule" 
as invented in economic theory by John von ~eumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern ( 1944) • (Hirshlei fer, 1974, Hirshleifer and 
Riley, 1979, Green, 1976) 
Assume there are several actions (a), whose consequences (CJ 
chooses but not only depend on the action the individual 
also on an uncertain state of the world {s). If the states 
of the world arise with a known probability (p) and if the 
individual evaluates the consequences along a utility func-
tion (v), then the "expected utility rule" assumes that the 
individual chooses that action which maximizes his expected 
utility: 
( 1) = r v(c ) p(s) 
a,s 
s 
The second assumption in this context is on the form of the 
utility function v. This function is assumed to be linear in 
the relevant charakteristic; i.e. 
neutral. 
the individual is risk 
Although there is some consensus in economic literature that 
risk aversion is kind of a "normal behavior", risk neutral i-
ty is a standard assumption in the theory of search. 
(Lippman and McCall, 1979). The main reason for this is a 
dramatic ease in mathematics, since under the assumption 
of risk neutrality maximization of the expected utility is 
equivalent to the maximization of the expected consequence. 
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Therefore one can totally ignore the individuals utility 
function <l> and has only to deal with consequences - in the 
case of JOb search with wages. 
In the context of this paper the assumption of risk neu-
tral ity has a second advantage. Due to this assumption some 
rather surprising phenomena in part five and six of the 
paper can be clearly identified as information effects. At 
the end of the paper a few comments will be made on effects 
of risK aversion on the presented model. But besides this 
risk neutrality is assumed throughout the paper. 
l Therefore some of the symbols used above to illustrate 
the expected uti1 ity rule can be used later on in the 
paper with different meanings. 
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During the late sixties and early seventies, following the 
pioneering papers of Stigler {lq6l, 1962), the standard job 
search model was developed. 
Assume an inaividual who knows exactly the wage offer dis-
tribution in a labor market but not the ~ages specific 
employers will offer him. That is, he is absolutly sure 
that, say, ten percent of the employers will offer him wages 
higher than 200.000 Schilling a year, 40 percent wages high-
er than 150.000 Schilling and so on. Denote this 
distribution function by F. 
what he does not know is, who the employers are, who offer a 
specific wage level. 
Therefore the individual draws wage offers at random. Since 
he is absolutly sure about his knowledge of F he need not 
revise his opinion, even if he observes the lowest possible 
wage offer a hundred times 1n a row. Therefore this type 
of search model is termed "with perfect information on the 
wa~e offer distribution" • Herein lies the main difference 
to the search model of section 5 of this paper. 
rt is further assumed that the individual can observe wage 
the standard search model 7 
offers - random draws 
only at costs of C 
from the wage offer 
for each observation. 
distribution -
Further there 
is no predefined maximum number of observations and the 
individual can accept or reJect wage offers only when they 
are drawn. Offers once rejected are not valid any more. 
<2> As proved by Telser (1973) a sequential strategy is 
optimal for the individual. He calculates a 
level and searches until he observes a wage 
critical wage 
offer higher 
is the wsige than or equal to the critical wage level. This 
offer he accepts. 
As will be shown, for a specific wage offer distribution and 
specific search costs there is a specific optimal critical 
wage level, which maximizes the individual 's exµected 
income. 
The standard literature on job search does not clearly ais-
tinguish between an arbitrary critical wage level and the 
ootimal one. Although usually different mathematical symbols 
are used, verbally they are both termed "reservation wage". 
2 This assumption is of no importance in the standard 
search model, since the search strategies with and with-
out recall are the same under the information assumption 
drawn abOVE:!• However, in the model 
will be an important assumption and 
noted here. 
of section 5 this 
so it is already 
the standard search model 
To distinguish more clearly between these two, will use 
the term "reservation wage" (y) for an arbitrary critical 
wage level only, while the 
expected income will be 
reservation wage which ~aximizes 
called "optimal reservation wage" 
( Y* I• 
Secondly it should be stated more clearly than usual that 
both, reservation wage and optimal reservation wage, must be 
viewed as lifetime incomes. Search costs are kind of 
an investment, the return of which materializes 1n pay-
ments every week or every month over the individual 's 
reriod of employment. So the individual has to sum up all 
the future payments - appropriately discounted - to gain a 
measure of the same dimension as search or migration costs. 
When the individual follows the above sketched strategy and 
fixes a reservation wage, say, by thumb rule, 
his expected income? 
what will be 
First of all, before he can observe the value of the first 
wage offer, he has costs of c to get that offer. Since the 
distrioution function of 
there is a probability 
the wage offer distribution is F, 
of 1-F(y) that the wage offer he 
observes will be higher than or equal toy. If that happen:., 
the individual w i 11 accept the wage offer and stop 
searching. 
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With probability F(y) the individual will reject the wage 
offer and be in exactly the same situation as in the begin-
ning {see figure 1). 
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The expected income of this search sequence is an infinite 
sum of the following form: 
(2) E(x+) = -c + Jx dF(x) + F(y){-c + Jx dF(x) + F(y){-c .•. }} 
y y 
+ 
x income net of search costs 
this can be transformed to 
a, 
(3) E(x+) = -c/{1-F(y)} + Jx dF(x)/{1-F(y)} 
y 
"Where the first term on the right hand side represents the 
expected cost incurred wr1en the reservation waye is set 
equal to y and the second term is simply the conditional 
expected value of an offer given that it 1s at least y." 
the standard search model lC 
(Lippman & ~cCall, 1979, p.3) 
The optimal reservation wage can be extracted from (3) sim-
ply by differentiation with respect toy. This results in 
the following condition for the optimal reservation wage 
(Y*)• 
(4) c = f(x-y*)dF(x) 
Y* 
The left hand side is the marginal 
hand side represents the marginal 
cost, while the right 
return of an adaitional 
draw from the wage offer distribution. 
The expression on the right hand side of (4) is often formu-
lated a~ a function of y: 
( 5) H(y) f(x-y)dF(x) 
y 
"H is a convex, nonnegative, strictly decreasing function 
which approaches zero as y goes to infinity." 
McCall, 1979, p•4) 
the standard sear~h model 
(Lippman & 
11 
FIGURE 2. The graph of H(y) 
H(y) 
C ---------
H(y) 
y 
As can easily be seen from figure 2 there is a reverse 
relationship between search costs and the optimal reserva-
tion wage. If the search costs rise the individual becomes 
less selective and 
declines. (For a 
McCall, 1970, p.119) 
therefore his expected period of search 
formal prove of this relationship see 
As proved by Hall, Lippman & McCall 
(1979, p.146, Footnote 15) a mean 
increase in the riskiness of the wage offer 
leads to an upwaro shift of function H(y) 
preserving 
distribution 
in all points 
exept y=O <3> and therefore to an increase in the optimal 
reservation wage. 
3 Since there are no negative wages H(O) 1s equal to the 
mean of the wa~e offer d1str1bution. 
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There is an other important property of the optimal reserva-
ti on wage. 
equation 3 
Substituting Y* for 
reveals that the 
y and equation 4 for c in 
individual's expected income 
net of search costs when searching under the optimal reser-
vation wage is equal to the optimal reservation wage. 
Since both F and care fixed and the optimal reservation 
a function of these two only there is a specific wage is 
expected income for a given function F and given 
costs. Under the assumptions drawn above the optimal reser-
vation wage contains all the information the individual 
needs for an optimal search strategy. 
At the end of this section let's take a slightly different 
look at the search procedure. 
The expected income of continued search in an infinite 
search procedure is constant over the search process, as can 
easily be seen from equation (2) or (3). Therefore with the 
optimal reservation wage the in<'.lividual' s expected income of 
search is 
( 6) -c + f max(x,y*) dF(x) 
0 
The max-function in (6) can be graphed in the following way: 
the standard search model 
FIGURE 3. 
E(x+) 
X 
45° 
B 
X 
y* 
Since' y* does not change with the observed wage offer. Y* is 
al ine parallel to the x-axis. At point A the observed wage 
off er is equal to y* and the individual is indifferent 
between accepting x and continuing the search process. The 
max-function at different levels of x is indicate~ by the 
heavy drawn line y*-A-B. Equation (4) states that the costs 
of search must be equal to a function of the dotted area in 
figure 3. 
The aependence of the expected income of search on the res-
ervation wag~ - equation (3) - can be granhed in the follow-
in9 way: 
the standard search model l4 
FIGURE 4. 
+ E(x ,y) 
A 
Point Bis the optimdl point, where the expected income is a 
maximum and equal to the reservation wage. In point A the 
individual accepts every possible wage offer and his 
expected income therefore is the expected value of all wage 
offers minus search costs. In point C the costs of search 
are equal to the expected value of acceotable wage offers 
and therefore the expected income of search is zero. 
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4.0 THE STANDARD SEARCH MOOEl ANO MIGRATION 
Because of the regionalization and the information assump-
tions discussed above, the generalization of the standard 
search model to a multiregionaJ model is straightforward • 
Assume there is a system of n regions, with a specific wage 
offer distribution for every region. 
( 7) 
and a specific level of search costs 
( 8) 
Analogous to the standard search model the in di v i du a 1 is 
assumed to know all wage offer distributions and all seach 
costs and therefore can calculate an optimal 
wage 
reservation 
for every region. This is obtained via the multiregional 
form of equation (4) 
( 10) c, 
l f(x-y*) dFi(x) Yi 
Since the optimal reservation wages are equal 
the standard search model and migration 
to the 
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expected income net of search costs in all 
vidual can calculate the expected gain 
reqions the indi-
from migration by 
compdring the optimal reservation wage of his current region 
wit~ that one of region 
between these regions. 
minus the costs of ~igration 
without loss of generality we can assume that the individ-
ual's present region is region 1.. Then there is a vector of 
migration costs <4> 
( 11) C 1 1 ==O I C 1 2 , 
the elements of which will 
between the relevant regions. 
be correlated with distance 
The above mentioned comparison between net-expected-incomes 
can be formalized in the following way: 
k=1, ,n 
Note that region 1, the individual's present region, is 
included in this formulation. So there is a migration deci-
sions even if the individual does not move. 
4 In a more yeneral formulation, 
assumed to live 1n region 1, 
of m1qration costs. 
if the individual is not 
there is a full nxn matrix 
the standard search model and migration 17 
Since there is no stochastic element involved. condition 
{12) leads to a deterministic decision. so. if the as sump-
tions of the standard search model are fulfilled for all 
individuals and the wage level is the only relevant charac-
teristic of regions, all individuals residing in region 1 
will either all stay in 
region, which offers the 
minus migration costs. 
region l or all migrate to the 
highest optimal reservation wage 
In a multiregional context, it can be said, all ind1v1duals 
residing in a specific region make the same choice. If there 
are more arguments in the individual's utility function, 
condition (12) results in perfect separation of individuals 
over regions depending on the weights of the arguments in 
their utility function. 
However, condition (12) is valid only when there is no other 
option than search in region 1 or search in some other 
region. If the individual is already employed 
he receives an income of which - because 
in region 1, 
it has to 
be acceptable - 1s higher than the optimal reservation wage 
of region 1. <5> In this case the individual will move only 
reservation wage in region minus when the optimal 
miyration costs is higher than his actual income in region 
5 Not~ tnat x is gross income, not income net of search 
costs. 
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1, which is a realization of a random variable. 
So, viewed over the population of region 1, the probability 
that an individual will mic_Jrate from region l to region i is 
equal to the probability that the optimal reservation wage 
1n i minus migration costs exceeds x. This second probabi 1-
ity is 
(ily*-cm >=y*-c ) i 1i k 1k 
( 13) 
k 1 ' ,n 
So, if the individual is unemployed in his current reqion, 
both, the decision whether to chanye regions or not, and the 
decision where to migrate are deterministic as expressea by 
condition (12). If the individual is employed, the decision 
whether to move or not is stoch~stic as expressed in the 
probability statement of (13). On the other hand the deci-
sion where to migrate is still deterministic as expressed by 
the definition for in (13). <6> Since the individual 
always chooses the region wnere the optimal reservation 
wage minus migration costs is a maximum. provided he 
moves at all, this second part of the decision is equiv-
alent 1n the case of employment and unemployment. 
6 Note that there is a positive prooability 
when condition (12) is fulfilled. 
the standard search model and mi~ration 
1 n ( 13) only 
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However, the only distance variable terms in (l 2) and ( 13) 
are migration costs. So if one believes this model to be 
fairly correct, the whole distance effect as ooserved in 
empirical studies can only be caused by migration costs. 
Th1 s is a rather uncomfortable conclusion of this model 
type, especially if one 
is of no fundamental 
takes into account 
difference to a simple 
that 
model 
this 
with 
fixed re~ional characteristics. where no search is needed 
at all. As mentioned above, 
must be viewed as lifetime 
al I income and wage variables 
incomes, while migration costs 
are only payed once. So migration costs are rather small 
compared to optimal reservation wages of different regions 
or to the actual income 1n region 1. This makes the aoove 
mentioned conclusion of the model rather implausible. 
There is an other unrealistic implication of this type of 
model. Since by assumption the individual cannot imorove his 
knowledge about the wage offer distribution in a region, he 
will always migrate to the ootirnal region before starting a 
search procedure. Strategies, where the individual stays in 
region l while searching for a job in an other region are 
suboptimal, since they only incur higher costs but no higher 
returns. (For a formal proof see ~aier, 1qs3). 
Ubviously th1s result is contrary to empirical evidence. 
In principle these results hold for the risk averse 1nctivid-
the standard search m9del and mi3rat1on 20 
ual, too. If he has perfect knowledge about all the wage 
offer distributions he can calculate his expected util 1ty of 
income for every region. This measure takes into account the 
riskiness of the relevant wage offer distribution and the 
individual's preference towards risk, but is unaffected by 
distance (For a search model with risk aversion see Hall, 
Lippman and ~cCall, 1979}. In the migration context this 
assumption causes no change in the migration model presented 
above besides substitution of expected utilities of income 
for the optimal reservation wages. 
The crucial assumption of the standard search model is per-
feet knowledge about all the wage offer distributions. This 
assumption is the main reason for the unappealing theore-
tical results of this model. So in the next section I will 
drop this assumption and refer a job search model with 
imperfect knowledge on the wage offer distribution. In sec-
tion 6 this model will be analysed for 
the migration decision. 
the standard search model and mi~rat1on 
its implications on 
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Contrary to the preceeding chapters and following a paper of 
Michael Rothschild (1974) in this section a discrete formu-
lation for the wage offer distribution is used, instead of a 
continuous one. In the single region we are dealing with 
here, there are m descrete wage offers 
1n the wage offer distribution. 
Otner than before, the individual does not know this dis-
tribution exactly, but has some subjective knowledge. His 
knowledge is characterized by the vector N, 
( 15) 
,N 
m 
Where Nk can be termed "the number of times, wage level x 
- ' k 
wa~ observed by the individual". These observations are not 
necessarily taKen by the individual personally, but can also 
be experienced by friends and relatives, gained by updating 
earlier observations or submitted by the media or other 
1nformat1on distributing institutions. 
The vector N is a measure for the individuals exoeriences 
and informations and can be transformed to an equivalent 
JOU search with imperfect information about F 22 
measure, more convenient in this context. 
Let 
( 16) u = Nk/rn. 
k j J and v= 1/l:N. j J 
then the vector u and the scalar v contain exactly the same 
information as N. "This parameterization permits a dis-
tinction between the content of this information represented 
by u, and its precision, represented by v." (Rothschild, 
1974, p.695) In a more statistical sense u is the vector of 
relative frequencies, while vis the inverse of the sample 
size. 
If the individual's state of information is (u,v), one can 
ask the question, how additional information will he incor-
porated into that knowledge. In the formulation of equation 
(15), when the individual observes a wage offer x k' he 
updates his believes simply by adding l to the corresponding 
element t'k of the vector•~, ·while leaving all other elements 
unchangeo. Using the definitions of (16) it is easily seen 
that this updating rule is equal to 
(uk+v) 
'(v+1) 
um v 
' • • • ' ( v+ 1 ) ; ( v+ 1 ) 
where\. (u,v) symbolizes the updated (u,v), when xk is oDservect. 
ThLS updating function is equivalent to Bayes' theorem and 
JOb search with imperfect information about F 23 
the additional information 
manner. <7> 
is therefore used in an optimal 
Some inspection of {17) reveals the following character-
istics of the updating function: 
• If the individual has only little information about the 
wage offer distribution - i.e. v is relatively high - • 
he revises the vector u much more than when he has much 
information - vis close to zero. 
• Perfect information about the wage offer distribution, 
as assumed in sections 3 and 4, is represented by v=O 
and so a special case of this formulation. 
Besides updatinq his state of information the indiviual has 
to decide about accepting or rejecting the wage offer drawn. 
In principle there is the same situation as 1n section 3. 
The individual has costs of c for each draw from the wage 
offer distribution and he has to decide if the expected out-
7 Additional information is of the same weight as informa-
tion already at hand. If the individual uses equation 
(17) to incorporate a whole 
believes (u,v), the result is 
set of information into his 
always the same independ-
ently from the sequence in which the information comes 
up. 
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come of an additional draw <8> is worth these costs. If not 
he better accepts the actual wage offer. Other than in sec-
tion 3 the individual's opinion of the wage offer distrib-
ution now changes through the updating mechanism discussed 
above. Therefore the probability with which the individual 
expects an acceptable wage offer to come up at the next draw 
depends on the wage offers already observed. So there is no 
simple formulation for the expected income of search as in 
equation (2). 
Instead one has to go through an induction argument of the 
following .;ay: 
Suppose that the individual's state of information 1s (u;v) 
and he is allowed to take just one more draw from the wage 
offer distribution after the actual one. <9> Then the 
expected income from the very last draw is: 
( 18) 1 V (u;v) 
where V indicates expected income, (u;v) the individual's 
state of information and the superscript l symbolizes that 
JUSt one more draw is allowed. Since the individual will 
accept this last draw in any case, the expected income of 
ti As before only the actual wa9e offer can be accepted. 
9 The information gained from the actual 
already included in (u;vJ. 
JOb search w1th imperfect information about F 
wage offer is 
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this last draw 1s simply the expected value of the wage 
offer drawn, minus the costs of search. 
Therefore the individual will accept the actual wage offer. 
if it is at least equal to the expected income of the last 
draw: 
( 19 l Accept x if 1 x >= V (u;v) 
If the individual is allowed to take two more draws from the 
waye offer distribution, equation (19) has to be changed to 
(20) Accept x if 2 x >= V (u;v) 
where 
{ 21 ) 2 V (u;v) 
and the expected return of the very last draw. now pushed 
one step back, with ' u ,v substituted of 
equation (21) 1s 
( 22) 1 V (u' ;v') 
So the expected return in one step of the search procedure 
always depends on the expected return of the next step in 
the following way: <10>. 
JOb search with imperfect information about F 26 
( 2 3) v11(u;v) -c + 
When the ac tua 1 wage offer is s t i 11 unknown, the 
individual's decision rule is: 
( 24) Accept x if X >= n-1 V (hk(u;v)) 
Let 
V(u;v) 
Then (23) and (24) can be reformulated for the unlimited 
search procedure <11> in the following way 
( 25) V(u;v) = -c + 
If there are more than two possible wage offers, the ques-
tion arises, whether the reservation wage property of the 
standard search model is valid or not. With this property 
there is a single wage offer, which divides the set of all 
possible waye offers into two convex sets. The set of 
10 This definition includes (18), (21) and (22) since 
0 . 1 V (u,v) lS e• ua to zero. 
11 Strictly speak,ng, there is no external limit to the 
number of possible draws from the wage offer distrib-
ution. As will be seen later, there is an internal limi-
tation throuyh the updating mechanism for the 
tndividual' s believes. 
JOb search with impe~fect information about F 27 
acceptable (A) and the set of unacceptable wage offers (U). 
(see figure 5) 
So, if the reservation wage property is valid, every wage 
offer hi~her than - or equal to - that critical value is 
acceptable and every wage offer lower than the critical val-
ue is unacceptable. 
Under the assumptions drawn above, one can construct exam-
ples, wnere the reservation wage property is not valid. 
(Rothschild, 1974, p.701; Lippman & McCall, 1976, p • l74) But 
as proved by Rothschild, the reservation wage property is 
valid in this model, when the distribution of the 
individual's believes about the parameters of the wage offer 
distribution is Dirichlet. Since the Dirichlet distrioution 
is 
1. the conjugate prior to the multinomial distribution and 
2. the likelihood function of the parameters of a sample 
out of a multinomial distribution (De Groot, 1970; Fabi-
us, 1<)73) 
Rothschild's result is more general than it seems to be at 
first look. Whenever the individual's bel 1eves about the 
waye offer distribution are based on observations rationally 
combined, the parameters of his waae offer distribution. are 
JOb search with imperfect 1nformat1on about F 28 
distributed dirichlet and the reservation wage property is 
V<3l i do 
Troughout the rest of the paper I will assume that the indi-
vidual's knowledge about the wage offer distrioution is 
based on observations and therefore the reservation wage 
property is valid. So the two sets of acceptable and of 
unacceptable wage offers always form convex sets. 
Since the expected income of continued search in this model 
type not only depends on- the individual's state of informa-
tion, but also on the value of the actual wage offer, the 
optimal reservation wage in a specific state of the search 
procedure (Y*(u;v)) is defined by: 
(26) y*(u;v) min{V(hk (u;v)) lxk>=V(hk (u;v))} 
This search procedure has some important properties: 
1. There is a maximum number of draws. even 
procedure is unlimited. 
if the search 
2 • "As the costs of search increase, search decreases" 
(Rothschild, 1974, p.700) 
3. V(hk(u;v)) is a nondecreasin9 function of Xk• (proved oy 
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Rothschild• .1974• p.703) 
4 • y*(u;v) cannot increase during the search procedure • 
For a given vector u. expected income of search 
increases as v decreases. 
Properties one and four 
property and updating 
result from the reservation wage 
function ( 17) • The individual w i 11 
continue search only when the actual wage offer is 1 ower 
than the optimal reservation wage. Therefore he reduces the 
subjective probabilities for all wage offers acceptable in 
this stage. i.e. the probability of the set of acceptable 
wa::ie of fer s. In the next step. the optimal reservation wage 
wi 11 be lower (Property 4) and the set of acceptable wage 
offers eventually increased. Through this mechanism repeated 
unsuccessful draws must lead to a point• when the set of 
acceptable wage offers contains the entire set of wage 
offers. and the search procedure terminates at the next 
draw. irrespective of the wage offer drawn • (Property 1) 
Property 5 states that more precise information on the wage 
offer distribution - i.e. lower v - leads to a hig~er level 
of expected income. Compared to a search procedure with per-
fect information - v=O - , the optimal reservation wage cal-
culated with imperfect information will be somewhere above 
or below the "correct" optimal reservation wage. For a low 
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level of v, the actual optimal reservation wage will more 
likely be close to the "correct" one than for a large value 
Of V• Since deviations in both directions lead to lower 
incomes (see figure 4), in a situation with less precise 
information on the wage offer distribution, the individual's 
expected income must be lower. Note that this result holds, 
although we assumed the individual to be risk neutral. 
Fi~ure 5 summarizes the search problem graphically: 
FIGURE 5. 
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The expected return of continued search is an increasing 
function of the possible actual wage offers. Dec1s1on rule 
(25) is fulfilled for wage offer 4, 5 and o. The exµected 
return of continued search at wage offer 4 is the optimal 
reservation wage as defined by (26). So If wage offer 4, 5 
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or 6 is observed, the actual wage offer is higher than the 
expected income of continued search, starting with the 
revised wage offer distribution. Therefore the 
will accept the wage offer, and stop searching. 
individual 
If an unacceptable wage offer (1,2 or 3) is observed, the 
probability of each of the acceptable wage offers will be 
lowered by the factor 1/(l+v), and so in the next step the 
individual will bel 1eve the wage offers 4, 5 and 6 to be 
less probable by this factor. Therefore the individual will 
become less selective, i.e. in the continuous case his set 
of acceptable wage offers wi 11 increase, while in the dis-
crete case the set of acceptable wage offers eventually will 
increase, if the highest unacceptable wage offer is close 
enou~h to the optimal reservation wage. If the individual 
observes a whole sequence of unacceptable wage offers, one 
by one the ever highest unacceptable wage offer will become 
acceptable. 
On the other hand, the individual gains more and more infor-
mation about the wage offer distribution. Therefore the 
influence of the actual wage offer on the in di v i du a 1 's 
believes about the wage offer distribution will become less 
later on in the search procedure. So the graph of the func-
t ion V ( h k( u; v) ) becomes less steep, as v comes closer to 
zero. When v 1 s zero. i.e. when information about the wage 
offer distribution is perfect <12>, the qraph of V{hk{u;v)) 
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1s parallel to the x-axis. {see figure 3J 
12 This state of knowledge cannot be obtained with a search 
procedure, starting with imperfect knowledge about the 
wage offer distri~ution. 
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6.0 IMPERFECT INFORMATION ABOUT F ANO MIGRATtON 
In this section I want to analyse the migration decision 
based on the search model presented above. In the case of 
perfect information about the wage offer distribution. the 
migration decision turned out to be rather simple. The 
individual had to compare the optimal reservation wages in 
the different regions net of migration costs <13> and to 
choose the region with the highest net value. 
aecause of the perfect information, the individual was 
assumed to have about all the wage offer distributions, it 
was always optimal for him, to migrate first, and then to 
start searching for a Job. 
As will be seen later on, with imperfect information aoout 
the wa~e offer d1str1bution, more strategies can be optimal. 
Three strategies will be analysed in this chapter. 
1. Search after migration 
This is the strategy that was found to ie optimal 1n 
13 For his present region, he either had to choose the 
optimal reservation wage or his present wage level, when 
he is unemployed or employed, respectively. 
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section 4• The 
decision, migrates 
individual first makes his migration 
to the region chosen and starts to 
search for a JOb there. But othe~ than in section 4, 
with imperfect information about the wage offer distrio-
uti on, return mi 'e:Jrat ion may turn out to be oot i ma l dur-
ing the search procedure. 
2. Buy information 
In this strategy an additional ootion is offered to the 
individual. Before making his migration decision, he is 
allowed to buy additional information about the wage 
offer distribution of a region possibly chosen. Besides 
the migration decision, the individual has to decide, 
whether to make the migration decision now, or first to 
buy additional information. 
3. Search before migration. 
In this strategy the individual is al lowed, first to 
find a job in an other than his present region, and then 
to migrate to that region. For interregional search, of 
course, search costs are higher 
migration. 
than for search after 
To keep thin~s tractabe, most of the presentation will be 1n 
a two regions system, only. Region l is the individual's 
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present region, region j a region possibly chosen. For 
region 1, let's assume, the individual has perfect informa-
tion about the wage offer distribution. 
So, for region 1 there are a wage offer distribution F 1(y), 
s 
search costs~. and following from these an optimal reser-
vation wage Yf• <14> Region j is characterized by ~he indi-
vioual 's believes about the wage offer distribution (u;v) 
and search costs q. Based on this, the individual can cal-
culate the expected income of search in region j - v5(uiv) -
J 
as defined by (25), by backward induction. As in section 4, 
migration from 1 to j is only possible on migration costs 
rn c., j • 
This strategy seems to be analogous to the model discussed 
1n chaµter 4. The individual compares the optimal reserva-
tion wage of region 1 with the expected income of search in 
region j minus migration costs from l to J• and chooses the 
re~ion with the highest net value. 
14 If possible without causing confusion, the index for the 
region is dropped. The suoerscript s denotes search. 
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( 28) migrate to j if s m Vj (u;v) - c 1 j > y 1 
Superscripts indicatinq a search strategy 
A search strateyy of this type can be generalized for n 
regions straightforwardlt• 
In this model type, the influence of distance is not only 
via migration costs, but also via V5 {u;v). 
J 
Since 1 ess pre-
cise knowledge about the wage offer distribution reduces the 
expected income of search, and the orecision of knowledye 
w i l 1 very likely decrease with distance. In the average 
there is a neyative relationship 
tance. 
between V~(u;v) 
J 
and dis-
Assume the individual has used the criterion mentioned above 
and decided to migrate to region j. So, his situation at the 
beginning of the search procedure could be as described in 
the following figure: 
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FIGURE 6. 
__ _._ ___________________ x 
x1 
The individual had only little information about the wage 
offer distribution in region j, and so the graph of the 
function is relatively steep. However, his 
information indicated that there are some great possibil-
s m 
ities in that region, and so V j{u;v)-c 1j turned out to be 
larger than Y*• 1 
But, if on his first draw the individual observes a wage 
offer lower than x1 (see figure 6), he has to revise his 
believes that much, that now migration back to region I and 
search with y7 offers higher income expectations than con-
tinued search 1n region J• So y*-crn is kin~ of a lower bar-
1 j 1 
rier for tolerable revisions of expected income, and it acts 
as insurance against heavy frustrations of the individual's 
Imperfect information about F and migration 38 
expectations. This insurance~ of course, is relevant only 
when there are waye offers lower 
region j. 
than v*-cm 
1 j 1 possible in 
On the other hand, this insurance should be taken into 
account in the miyration decision. V{u;v), as defined by 
(25), is the correct indicator o~ly when no return mir~ation 
is allowed. The expected income of search, with return 
miyration allowed, V1;{u:v), is 
(29) '-T.(u;v) 
J 
J 
Since return migration is simply an additional option to the 
options considered in V1u:v), it can be said that 
(30) '-T.(u;v) >= ~(u;v) 
J J 
with strict equality only when there are no possible wage 
offers lower than y*-cll • So V~(u,v) is a lower bound for 
1 j 1 J 
v1;1u;v) and (28) is a sufficient but not necassary condition 
J 
for miyration to j to be optimal. 
Necessary and sufficient in this strategy is 
I 31) migrate to j if r m Vj(u;vJ-c 1j > y~ 
In a multiregional model, the expected income of search net 
of migration costs in all other regions could serve as 
insurance. So in all steps of the search procedure, the 
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expected incomes of all other regions should be considered, 
and a strict generalization for n regions turns out to be 
rather complicated. 
6.2 BUY INFORMATION 
If the individual uses the strategy described above ana is 
unlucky, he ends up back in region 1, with migration costs 
payed twice. This unsatisfactory result is more probable, 
when the individual has only little information about the 
wage offer distribution in region j• So one can ask, whether 
the individual can avoid this by gathering more information 
prior to the migration decision. Or, more general, are there 
situations, where postponing the migration decision for buy-
1ng additional information is an optimal strategy? lnforma-
tion the individual can buy is assumed to be of exactly the 
same quality as the information connected with search activ-
ities. It is a random draw from the wage offer distribution, 
but when purchasing information the individual can only 
observe the value of the wage offer and utilize it for 
updating h1s believes about the wage offer distribution and 
he cannot accept the observed wage offer. For an individual 
in region 1, observation of one wage offer in region J is 
dssumed to cost i c 1 j, where the superscript indicates the 
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information strategy. 
To answer the question, whether buying information will be 
worth the costs, the individual has to calculate his 
expected return from information. This expected return 
depends on the different choices, the individual can make. 
If there are no other options than going to region J• the 
individual has to go anyways, and information would be 
worthless. So the returns from information and from search 
are interrelated. (Mag, 1977) 
In our model there are three options: 
l• stay in region land search for a job there, 
2. go to region j and search for a ;ob there 
J. postpone the migration decision and buy more information 
about the wage offer distribution in region J• 
Therefore, the expected return from information is: 
The three elements of the max-function in (32) are the 
expected returns of the three ootions listed above. 
In general there are two sequential strategies combined: An 
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information strategy and a job search strategy. The informa-
tion strategy is used to improve the basis for the migration 
decision and the job search strategy and therefore always 
precedes these two. So in the beginning and in every possi-
ble step of the information procedure the individual has to 
decide, whether he will buy information or make his 
migration decision and start searching for a job in the 
region chosen. If he decides to stop, or even not to begin 
the information strategy, he has to make his migration deci-
sion on basis of the state of knowledge about the wage offer 
distribution accumulated up to this point in time. So, basis 
for the migration decision are still the optimal reservation 
wage in region land the expected income of search net of 
migration costs in region J• But the expected income of 
search now varies through the information process, depending 
on the wage offers observed through this process. 
The ~eneral process is sketched in figure 7. 
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FIGURE 7. 
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To simpl 1fy the presentation, let's drop the last element of 
the max-function in (32), i.e. assume the individual is 
allowed to buy only one unit of information. 
Then, for an information strategy to be optimal, the 
expected return of inform~tion must be higher than both, the 
expected return of search in j minus migration costs, and 
the optimal reservation wage in l. 
(33) i r m vj (u;v) > vj (u;v)-c 1 j 
(34) 
Imperfect information about F and ~i~ration 43 
Substituting (29) and the simplified form of (32) into (33) 
and (34) yields the following conditions. both sufficient 
for an information strategy to be optimal. 
Graphically the max functions in (35) can be presented in 
the following way. 
FIGURE 8. 
' 
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The first max-funct1on of (35) is pictured by the line 
A-B-c-o. the second max-function by E-8-C-F 
So the difference between these two functions is positive in 
the shaded area of figure 8, and negative in the dotted one. 
Since the left hand side of (35) i5 a weighted sum of the 
difference between the two functions. the size of these two 
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areas is important for condition (35) to be fulfilled. 
It is the main difference between a search and an inform&-
tion strategy, that the observation of high wage offers does 
not necessarily terminate the information process. There-
can shift up or down, when know-
ledge is accumulated. However, more information leads to a 
I ess steep function V ~(h k( u; 11)). 
Now let• s turn to condition (36). The max-function and Yl 
can be graphed in the following way: 
FIGURE 9. F 
D • .r m 
Vj(!\(U;V))-Clj 
G 
E 
X 
m, 
C I , 
1j :," 
The max-function in (36J is exactly the same as the first 
max-function in ( 35) and therefore reoresented by line 
A-8-C-O. Y* is invariant with x and therefore represented oy 
line A-B-G, parallel to the x-axis. The difference between 
these two functions is ind1cate1 by the shaded area in fig-
ure 9. The riyht hand side of (3&) is positive. 
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Before we go to analyse the effects of parameter changes on 
conditions (35) and (36), recall our assumption that the 
individual can buy information only once. By dropping this 
assumption, we introduce an additional option in the first 
max-function of (35) and the max function of (36) (see fig-
ure (7)}• This eventually enlarges these functions, while 
leaving the functions to he substracted from them unchanged. 
Therefore this additional option can only enlarge, never 
reduce the left hand sides of (35) and (36). It follows that 
in the more general formulation {32) conditions (35) and 
(36) are sufficient, but not necessary for an information 
strate~y to be optimal. So, whenever the purchase of JUSt 
one unit of information is worth the costs, buying informa-
tion must be optimal. But buying information can be optimal, 
although the purchase of a single unit of information is not 
worth the costs. 
For the analysis of parameter changes, let's return to fig-
ure 8 and figure 9. 
As already noted above, additional information leads to a 
less steep graph of v. <15> If the new graph is reached by, 
say, turning V in point B - i.e. by observing about average 
wage offers - , the size of the positive (shaded) area in 
15 If possible without causing confusion let's use v as a 
short term for V5 (h (u;v))• j k 
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both, figure Band figure 9, are reduced, while the negative 
(dotted) area in figure 9 is enlarged. So both, condition 
(35) and (36), are less likely fulfilled, when the individ-
ual has Detter knowledge of this kind. 
If the graph of V becomes less steep and shifts downwards-
1.e. the individual observes low wage offers through the 
information process - , the main effect wtll be a reduction 
of the shaded area in figure 
area will be enlarged, ,..,hile 
9. In figure B the negative 
the positive area will roughly 
remain of the same size. So most likely condition (36) will 
fail for the next step, i.e. the individual will 
region land search for a JOb there. 
stay in 
An upward shifted and less steep graph of V caused by the 
observation of high wage offers in the information process 
reduces the positive (shaded) area in figure B, while the 
negative (dotted) area in figure Band the positive (shaded) 
area in figure 9 will remain roughly of the same size. So, 
in this case condition (35) is the critical one in the next 
step, i.e. the individual will most likely migrate to region 
J and search for a job there. 
Since the information strategy as defined in (32) ano as 
sketched in figure 7 is not limited by definition, the ques-
tion arises, whether the information sequence always must 
terminate or can it be the optimal choice forever. 
Imperfect information about F and mi~ration 47 
If the individual accumulates more and more information his 
state of knowledge comes close to the state of perfect 
information about the wage offer distribution. So the 
mL;1rati on model discussed in section 4 can be viewed as a 
limiting situation to the information strategy. Graphically 
this is expressed in decreasing steepness of v. In the case 
of perfect information the graph of v will be parallel toy* 
and the expected income of search net of migration costs in 
region j will either be above or below the optimal reserva-
tion wage in region 1. 
It is easy to see from (32} that with positive information 
costs the following relation must hold: 
(37) 
,S 
where Vj 
v~ = 
J 
is equal to y~. as 
J 
defined in (9). Therefore at 
least one of the elements in the max-function of (37) must 
oe h1gner than the expected return of information, and .pur-
ct-ias,ny information cannot be an optimal situation in this 
limiting situation. 
terminate sometimes, 
Therefore the information sequence must 
when the individuals knowledge about 
the wage offer distribution is still imperfect. Only when 
information costs are zero, 
1s possible. 
an endless information sequence 
Since with oositive information costs every information 
sequence is limited, and after t8rmination of 
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tion sequence the i ndi Vi dual 
search of 
has to choose between the 
expected income of two regions, the expected 
return of information can be calculated for the individuals 
state of knowledge at the beginning and - if buying informa-
tion is an optimal strate~y - for every state of knowledge 
the individual can reach by the information strategy. So 
the individual can both, determine 
optimal in his present situation, 
if buying information 1s 
and precalculate, if buy-
in~ an additional unit of information will be optimal, pro-
vided a specific wage offer is observed. 
Therefore he can devide the set of all wage offers possibly 
observed into three sets: 
l• The set of wage offers, which make him stop the informa-
tion sequence and stay in region 1. 
The set of wage offers, which make him continue the 
search sequence. 
3. The set of wage offers, which make him stop the search 
sequence and migrate to region j. 
The three possib1l ities discussed above by moving V in fig-
ures (8) and (q) indicate, that these three sets are in 
increasing order of wage offers. If none of the three sets 
is empty, very low wage offers will be in set l, medium wage 
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offers in set 2 and very high wage offers 1n set 3. 
Because of the termination of every information sequence as 
discussed above. set 2 has to diminish during the informa-
tion sequence and sometimes become the empty set. 
Now let's discuss the problems of multiregional generalisa-
tion. In (32) the expected return of information about the 
wage offer distribution in region j is defined on expected 
returns of searcn of both, region j and region 1. This is 
because the expected return of search in principle is an 
expected return of postponing the migration decision. 
Therefore a multiregional version of (32) has to consider 
the expec~ed returns of search and of information in all 
regions which can be chosen. Since the expected returns of 
information 1n the other regions, too. must be defined in 
this multiregional way, this creates a disturbing complexity 
of this model in a multiregional context. 
Let me illustrate this with the following example: In the 
beginning the individual 
about the wage offer 
finds it optimal to buy information 
distribution in 
observes a low wage offer, it turns 
region 
out that 
j. when he 
purchasing 
information about an other region, region k, 1s optimal. 
When he observes a low wage offer ink in the next step, his 
optimal strategy is to go on to region 1 or back to region j 
and bui information there; and so on until he ends uµ in one 
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of the reqions searching for a job. In a correct calculation 
of V~, the individual has to consider this and all the other 
J 
possibilities of that kind. 
Since all these parameters are elements of a max-function, 
it can be argued that neglecting these possibilities would 
not cause a large error. Following this argument one can 
define lower bounds for the expected returns of information 
for all regions in the following way: 
In this definition for every region possibly chosen the 
1naividual makes only a paired comparison between this 
region and his present region. This calculation can be done 
for all regions seperately and the individual ends up with 
two (n-1)-dimensional vectors, a vector of lo~er bounds of 
expected returns of information (as defined by {33)) and a 
vector of expected incomes of search (as defined by (25)) 
net of migration costs. ~ote that also the possib1l1ty of 
return migration has to be excluded here and in definition 
(38) because return migration would include multiregional 
complexity again. 
With these two vectors at hand the individual can compare 
their values and Y*• The largest value inaicates the "opti-
mal" strategy for the next step, which is either a search or 
an information strategy in one of the regions • If yo IS the 
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maximum value the information problem is solved and the 
individual starts a search procedure in his present region. 
Is one of the Vi's, say i v1 , the largest value, the individ-
ual observes a wage offer in region 1, updates his opinion 
about the wage offer ~istribution in l and substitutes 
two vectors respectively. 
ana the elements of the 
in the 
Again the largest value out of y* j 
two vectors indicates the "optimal" 
strategy for the next step. 
If vy is the largest value the individual migrates to region 
l and starts searching for a job there. In this case not 
only the expected returns of information and search for 
region 1 have to be changed, but both vectors must be recal-
culated because of the changes in the information and 
migration costs. Observation of a wage offer leads to exact-
ly the same changes as described for the information case 
above. 
Up to now we d1d not analyse the influence of the different 
kinds of costs. Recalling (35) and (36) it is easy to see 
that an increase in migration costs will increase the left 
hand side of (35) but decrease the left hand side of (36). 
In extremt constellations one of these two may remain 
unchanged. Compared with the expected r~turn of search in 
region Jan information procedure becomes more, compared 
with the opt1mdl reservation wage 1n 1 less attractive. 
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Or put it some other way round: An 1ncre'lse in migration 
costs r"!duces the expected return of search net of search 
costs, reduces the expected return of information by a smal-
ler amount and leaves the optimal reservation wage in region 
l unchanyed. 
Chdnges in search costs can occur in region land/or re~ion 
J• where they cause chanyes 
and/or the expected return 
op~osite direction. So an 
in the optimal reservation wage 
of s"!arch respectively in the 
increase in search costs in 
re9ion 1 (region j) leads to a decrease in yt;. (V (u;v)) and 
leaves V (u;v) (y*) unchanged. Since both, Y* and V (u;v), 
are elements of the max-function in (32) decreases in either 
of them reduce the expected return of information. but by an 
amount less than the triggering reduction. 
More interesting in this context are changes in information 
costs. In ( 3 5) an <i ( 3 6) information costs are included only 
in the right hand sides and with positive signs. Therefore 
an increase in information costs makes an information strat-
egy less attractive compared with both, the ootimal reserva-
tion wage 1n 1 and the expected return of search in J• As we 
found out above, using the more general formulat1on (32), an 
infinite information strate9y is possihle onlv when the 
information costs are zero. This result for the limiting 
~ase and the ~eneral aefinition of the expected return of 
sedrch (32) indicate that larger information costs •,oll lead 
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to a shorter information procedure prior to the migration 
decision. Tnis has an important implication for migration: 
Assume a system of three regions, region 1, region k and 
region l, where k and l differ fn information costs only. 
Us1n9 the multireqional information strateqy discussed 
above, the optimal information procedure 
the re~ion with low information costs, 
will be longer for 
say reyion l, and so 
the individual can make his migration decision concerning 
this region on the basis of better knowledge about the wage 
off er distr1but1on. T t.at this difference in information 
costs maKes region 1 preferable to 
clear, wnen the information procedure 
ly different way. 
region k 
is viewed 
becomes very 
in a slight-
Let two individuals in region l follow an optimal informa-
tion strategy, one with respect of region k and the other 
with respect of region 1, and both observe exactly the same 
wa~e offers 1n every step of the information procedure. At 
th-=: point, when it is optimal for the individual buying 
information about k to stop and make the migration decision, 
both individuals have exactly the same state of knowledge 
about the waJe offer distributions in ls: and 
The only difference is that the individual 
respect I ve 1 Y• 
buying 1nforma-
tion about l has spent less money up to this point. Even if 
wf' assume that he has to stop his tnforrnation pro~edure at 
this point, altnouqh his optimal strategy i s to buy mor<> 
information, his action 1s superior to the one of the inrli-
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vidual purchasing 1nformation about region k. 
Wit'. this relationship in mind the institutional framework 
of the information system becomes an 1 mportant f :1ctor in 
rniyrat1on. Through two channels: First it influences the 
a-priori state of knowledge individuals have about specific 
reJions, and seconJ it determines the costs of an informa-
tion procedure. If the information system works in Favor of 
a specific region or a specific type of reqion usually 
large urban centers - miyrat1on flows will be oiased towards 
these regions. 
Al so some other Factors are important in this context. The 
most important one are friends and relatives, who live in a 
region possibly chosen. Usually they constitute a very cheap 
source of information, a fact which makes this region more 
attractive, even if income is the only determinant in the 
migration decision and social bindinqs are totally ignored. 
In empirical studies this «frienas and relatives effect" is 
a phenomenon often found to be important {Greenwooa, 1969. 
1970; Laber, 1972; Levy and Wadycki, 1973; Rensha..i, 1974; 
and Sirmans, 1979; .\Jperovich et.al., Langley, 1974; Kau 
1977; Walsh, 1974; for an overview see: Shaw, 1975). 
The question arises, where the more intensive connection 
betweer. people 1n one and people in an other reJion comes 
from. In the stud1~s cited above this variable is usua 11 y 
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ooerationalized by 
sized that people, 
lagged migration flows. It 
who once lived in region l 
is hypothe-
and now live 
1n region J are an important channel of information. 
But besides that in reality there are many more types of 
contact, 
effct". 
which can lead to a "friends and relatives 
For example: holiday travels, contacts emanating 
form ,;ork or studies or the individual's actions space 
around his place of residence. 
From a micro point of v1"!w, the individual's social history 
turns out to be an important factor in the migration deci-
sion, while 1n the average all these factors are correlated 
with distance. 
Otner than in the model of section 4, now there are three 
mechanisms throu;h which the migration decision 
enced by distance: 
is i nfl u-
2. the a- i.:-, r i or i 
tributions 
state of knowledge about wage offer dis-
3. information costs 
To'::iether th~y CdUSe a more "realistic" distance effect • 
lrnµerf~ct_ 1nformat1on about f- ano rni'::iration 
althouyh it always has to be mentioned that the ~iqration 
model 1s drast1cally simplified compared to reality. The two 
most important simplifications are risk neutrality and con-
siueration of income as the only determ1nant of the 
migration decision. 
6.3 SEARCH BEFORE MIGRATION 
In this strategy the individual can combine the advantages 
of both, search and information. rle can accumulate informa-
tion about an imperfectly known wage offer distribut1on pri-
or to migration and accept favourable waJe offers, too. 
These advantages are gained on the expense of higher search 
costs, since for every draw from the wage offer distribution 
J the individual must overcome the distance 
between region i and region j. This causes additional costs 
to the search costs, ,35 defined in sect ion 5. Therefore 
every draw in this strategy costs the standard search costs 
c ~ of re':)ion j plus travel costs c~j from rl'.'':)ion 1 to region 
J and back again, 
prior to migration. 
where the superscript o denotes search 
To keep thinys tractable let's iJnore the information strat-
egy anu consider the Following options only: 
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The individual can 
1. stay in re~ion 1 and search for a Job there 
2. mi~rate to region J and search for a job there, or 
3. stay in region 1 and search for a JOb in region J• 
Therefore the ex~ected return of a searc~ before migration 
strate'.iy is 
I 39) vf: (u;v) 
J 
ln tne beginning tne individual has to find the best one out 
of tne options l1sted above; i.e. he has to find the maximum 
from v=,'• v; and "3• If V~ is this maximum value, observa-J 
tion of a waye offer brings up a fourth option. The 1ndivid-
ual can accept this wage offer. He w i 11 do this, if the 
observed waqe offer minus miyrat1on costs is higher than tne 
returns of the three other options calculated on basis of 
the rev i sec wage offer distribution. If some other option 
offers a higner net return the individual will choose this 
one in tne next step. This optimal selection is expresseo in 
the max-function in (39). 
AS in 
( 39). 
section 6.?. 1et's dro~ +he element V~(hk(u;v)) 1n 
Tnis is done for simnlification. 
lm~erfect 1nformdt1on about F and mi~rat1on ':,8 
Tl-ien, for t'le individual to accept a search befor<'> 11igr3tion 
strategy, the follow1ny two relations must hold: 
( 4u- l vP ( ) vs ( ) m j u;v > j u;v -c 1 j 
( 41 ) V~ ( U ,• V) J > Y1 
Suostitu~ion and some basic transfor~a~ions yield the fol-
lowing two conditions sufficient for the search before 
mi~rat1on strate~y to be optimal. 
( 42 l !:1.\{max{y1 '~J. (h. (u;v) )-cm1 . ,x. -cm1 . }-max{~ (h. (u;v) )-cm. ,x. -cm.}} > J?. k -"k J K J J -"k 1J K 1J 1J 
(43) ?7c{max{y1,~(h.. (u;v))-cm1 .,x.-cm1 .}-y*} > c~+d? k J -"k J K J 1 J 1 j 
These condtitions are similar to (35) and (36) above • This 
1s clearly revealed by the graphical analysis: 
F 
FIGURE 10. 
A 
G 
E 
,___.._ __________________ x 
m ' ' c, j: ;, ' 
,, 
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The first rnax function In (42) is graphed by the line 
A-B-C-f, while the second max function is E-B-C-F. The dif-
ference uetween the two functions is indicated by the shaded 
area in figure 10 • 
ThB left hand sije of condition (43) is oresented in figure 
11. 
FIGURE 11. F 
G 
A i---------:;,,""','~-1-l-..U....LLLLLLL.LJ..L.1...U...W..L-.·Y* 
X 
The max function in (43) is equal to the first one in (42) 
and a9a1n ~rapned by A-B-C-F. y* is constant over all 
ohservable wage offers and so graphed by A-B-G. The differ-
ence hetween these two functions is indicated by the shaded 
area in figure 11. 
FiJure 10 1n the searct1 oefore migration case corresponds to 
fi:c1ure 8 in section b • 2 • The nos1tive (shad"'d) areas are tt1e 
6Q 
same in figure 8 and 10, but in fijure 10 no dotted area has 
to be suostracted. So the left hand side in (42) exceeds the 
left hand side in (35) by the area F-C-D in figure 10. Com-
µarison of figure 9 with figure 11 reveals that the left 
hand side of (43) exceeds the left hand side of ( 36) by 
exactly the same amount, the area F-C-D in figure 11. So 
both, the left hand side of 
left hand side of ( 35) or 
(42) and (43) differ from the 
(J6) respectively by the area 
F-c-o. 
An analoyous 
in (42) and 
( 3 5 J and ( 36) 
statement can be made for 
( 43) • They differ from the 
s p i by the factor ~ +c1j-c1j • 
the 
right 
right hand side 
hand sides in 
So search oefore migration is a strategy very similar to tne 
information strategy and all the results derived in section 
6.2. in principle hold for this strategy, too. 
Because of the similarity between the information and the 
search before migration strategy, it is easy to derive the 
condition wnen the second strategy 
first one. 
i~ preferable to the 
Calculations of exactly the same kind as done Defore lead to 
where the difference of the ~ax-functions of the left nand 
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Side m is nonzero (an1 positive) only when xk-clj is tne maxi-
mum element in the first rnax-funtion. So the left hand sioe 
of {44) again can be graphed by the area F-C-D in figure 10 
or 11. The ri~ht hand side of (44) is a function of the 
costs of the two strategies compared and it is easy to find 
out the effects of changes in costs of the different types 
in this formulation. But it should be noted, that condition 
(44) com~ares the search Defore migration and the informa-
tion strategy only. For the search before migration strategy 
to be tht: optifl1al one out of all strate,:Ji-es discussed, con-
ditions (42) and (43) must hold too. 
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7.0 SUMMARY ANO CONCLUSIONS 
In a migration context the assumption of the standaro search 
model turn out to be too restrictive to permit insights into 
the decision process. Many hypotheses derived from these 
assumptions contradict empirical observations {see sections 
3 and 4)• Dropping the assumption of perfect information 
about the wage offer distribution results in a more complex 
search model (s~ction 5). In this model information about 
the wage offer distribution is imperfect and accumulated 
through the search process. When based on this search 
model, the migration model is largely enriched and also more 
realistic. Strategies, which are suboptimal or even absurd 
with perf2ct information aoout the wage offer distribution, 
can be preferable in d 
information is assumed. 
migration model, 
The strategies 
wnen imperfect 
discussed in the 
paper are "return migration", "purchase of information about 
the wage offer distribution" and "search before migration". 
With these additional strategies many phenomena often 
dedected in empirical miqration studies can be explained. 
As an example the theoretical foundation in this ~odel for 
the well-known "frien1s and relatives effect" was 1iscussed 
in section 6.Z. 
Many of the factors important in this model, such as 1nfor-
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mation costs, travel costs, a priory state of knowledge, are 
hi~hly correlated with distance. They bring some theoretical 
flesh to the bones of the distance effect, which is so 
imµortant ,n all migration studies. 
On the other hand the high correlation with d,stance causes 
problems for the empirical testing of this model. with 
migration data as usually available, the different factors 
discussed above can hardly be seperated through estimation. 
what is needed is information on the state of knowledge 
migrants and non-migrants have about wage offer distrib-
utions in different regions and on the strategies they apply 
to improve their state of knowledge. Some information of 
this kind could be ~ained from questionaires, a techn I que 
not very common in this field of science. 
At the end of the paµer let's turn to a short discuss 10n of 
the individual's risk preference. Throughout the paper ·risk 
neutrality was assumed, an assumption, which eased the pres-
entation dramaticly. The question arises, whether the 
results I have derived above are valid under this special 
assumption only or they hold for a risk averse individual 
too. 
It is easy to see that 1n a search process the risk averse 
1ndivioual is less selective than the risk neutral one. The 
search process can be viewed as a sequence of decisions 
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between a certain income - the observed wage offer and a 
distribution of uncertain incomed - the possible draws later 
on. Since the risk averse individual values an uncertain 
income less than the risk neutral individual, there are wage 
offers, which the risk averse individual accepts, while they 
are reJected by the risk neutral one. 
In the case of search with imperfect information about the 
wage offer distribution a second risk component i '.:> intro-
duced in the model through the unknown parameters of the 
wage offer distribution. The individual 1 s state of knowledge 
( U; V) is an indicator for this second risk component. 
Because of the nature of the search process this risk compo-
nent is a repelling factor even with a risk neutral individ-
ual. The assumption of risk aversion will reinforce this 
tendenc Y• 
However, the effects of risk aversion show a tendency in the 
same dirt:ction as the model under the assumption of risk 
neutrality. Although not formally 1iscussed this indicates 
that for a risk averse individual the results of the model 
would be strengthened. So the 
valid not only under the very 
used throughou~ the paper. 
Summary and conclusions 
results derived seem to be 
special set of assumptions 
65 
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